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Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are united in 
perceiving Russian revisionist policies as a potential 
threat to their territorial integrity and sovereignty 
In recent years, NATO has made good progress 
in strengthening deterrence and defence 
postures on its eastern flank, including 
establishing a rotational Allied land component 
presence in the Baltic states and Poland. For 
quite some time, territorial defence seemed to 
be an obsolete need, a leftover from the Cold 
War era. However, Russia’s overt and covert 
uses of military force—against Georgia in 2008 
and against Ukraine since 2014—have 
profoundly altered the 
security environment and 
threat perceptions in the 
region and, indeed, across 
the entire Alliance.1 Has this 
new situation also provided 
opportunities for the Baltic 
states and Poland to 
enhance their cooperation in their defence 
policies? What are the factors that enable and 
facilitate the advancement of cooperation in 
this format—and are there any obstacles to be 
removed? Ultimately, if these four countries on 
NATO’s northeast flank are functioning 
smoothly as a quartet, what are the political 
and military steps they could take to bring their 
cooperation to a new and enhanced level?  
Drawing upon a series of interviews with 
defence policymakers and military practitioners 
in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, this 
policy paper examines the drivers, pressures 
and opportunities for closer defence 
cooperation among the Baltic states and Poland 
with the aim of articulating some 
recommendations as to how NATO’s “northeast 
quartet” could work together more 
harmoniously. 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, a special volume “Putin’s Russia: Down But 
Not Out”, Foreign Affairs, Volume 95, Number 3, May/June 2016. 
Even issues of nuclear deterrence have returned after decades of 
neglect. See, for instance, Bruce Blair, “Could U.S.-Russia Tensions 
Go Nuclear?”, Politico, November 27, 2015; or Franklin C. Miller, 
“Adjusting NATO’s Nuclear Policies: A Five Step Program”, Atlantic 
Council, NATOSource, March 23, 2016.  
The need for increased regional defence 
cooperation among the three Baltic states, as 
well as between the Baltic states and Poland, 
has particularly become salient since 2014, 
after the events in Ukraine. Poland, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania are united in perceiving 
Russian revisionist policies as a potential threat 
to their territorial integrity and sovereignty.2 
This common threat perception—combined 
with geostrategic reality of the Baltic states 
being a “peninsula” linked to the rest of the 
Alliance only through a narrow strip of land 
between Lithuania and Poland, the so-called 
Suwałki Gap—should be a strong driver to 
enhancing cooperation among these countries 
at every possible level. There is a growing sense 
in the defence establishments of the Baltic 
states and Poland that defence postures and 
policies have to be better coordinated across 
the region, and that closer cooperation 
between these countries can add to the overall 
deterrent effect of measures implemented by 
NATO.  
This regional cooperation is not starting from 
scratch. For almost two decades, the Baltic 
states have been developing trilateral 
cooperation frameworks such as BALTBAT, 
BALTNET, BALTRON and BALTDEFCOL.3 Those 
frameworks served as vehicles to build military 
capabilities, provide a common contribution to 
the Alliance and engage various Allies and 
partners, including Poland. The three countries’ 
bilateral relations with Poland have also been 
developing steadily. Lithuania and Poland in 
particular, despite a period of political tensions 
over issues related to the Polish minority in 
                                                          
2 See Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier: 
Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
3 BALTBAT—Baltic Battalion; BALTNET—Baltic Airspace 
Surveillance Network; BALTRON—Baltic [mine countermeasures] 
Squadron; BALTDEFCOL—Baltic Defence College. 
   
Poland’s military contribution to Baltic security within 
the framework of NATO has been quite visible and, 
lately, also more substantive 
Lithuania, built a strong partnership that 
included such cooperation frameworks as 
LITPOLBAT (until 2007) and, since 2014, 
LITPOLUKRBRIG together with Ukraine.4 
Lithuania’s procurement of Polish Grom man-
portable air defence systems (MANPADs) in 
2014 led to the subsequent training of 
Lithuanian personnel in Poland, and is a good 
example of bilateral cooperation.5 Another 
example of a successful bilateral programme is 
the Latvian-Polish project to train Latvian Joint 
Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) specialists for 
the Latvian National Armed Forces (LNAF) in 
Poland.6 
Poland’s military contribution to Baltic security 
within the framework of NATO has been quite 
visible and, lately, also more substantive. 
Poland has participated in the Baltic Air Policing 
(BAP) rotations regularly since 2006 (7 times 
altogether thus far).7 Furthermore, Poland is a 
contributing nation both to the NATO Strategic 
Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga 
and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn—and 
is in the process of joining the NATO Energy 
Security Centre of Excellence (ENSECCOE) in 
Vilnius. It has also sent officers to NATO Force 
Integration Units (NFIU) located in each of the 
three Baltic states. Furthermore, Poland has 
placed an armoured company within the 
Canadian-led NATO eFP battlegroup located in 
Ādaži, Latvia. The company has been rotated 
every six months since 2017, and occasionally is 
augmented by other subunits. For example, in 
                                                          
4 LITPOLBAT was a combined Polish-Lithuanian battalion for 
peacekeeping missions, headquartered in Orzysz, Poland. It was 
disbanded in 2007. LITPOLUKRBRIG is a trilateral brigade 
established in 2014 consisting of an international staff, three 
battalions, and specialised units. It is headquartered in Lublin, 
Poland. 
5 See Jakub Pavlovski, “Lithuanian Soldiers Involved in the Grom 
MANPADS Training Programme”, Defence24.com, December 1, 
2014. 
6 See Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia, Public Report 
of the Year 2015 (Riga, 2015), 21. 
7 Juliusz Sabak, “Polish Air Force’s F-16 Jets To Protect The Baltic 
Airspace, Starting from May”, Defence24.com, March 24, 2017.  
2017, one such augmentation was an artillery 
unit equipped with self-propelled multiple 
rocket launchers.8 Polish participation in 
military exercises conducted in the Baltic 
countries has been active and much 
appreciated by the host nations. (See Annex for 
a compendium of bilateral, trilateral and 
quadrilateral cooperation formats, programmes 
and initiatives). 
Despite this positive overall picture of 
cooperation in bilateral, multilateral and NATO 
frameworks as well as the general tone set by 
high-ranking officials about its importance, 
there is a sense that more could be done. This 
applies to political and 
military cooperation within 
NATO (e.g. on eFP, the 
Alliance’s adaptation and 
“Military Schengen”) and 
within the EU (e.g. on the 
development of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy, 
CSDP) as well as in bilateral and quadrilateral 
formats between and among Poland and the 
Baltic states. Poland’s military “footprint” in 
Estonia, for instance, is light, and the bilateral 
cooperation agenda is fairly thin. Baltic support 
to Poland’s positions—which are otherwise 
seen as closely aligned with those of the Baltic 
states—on such issues as NATO Force Structure 
(NFS) and NATO Command Structure (NCS) 
reforms has been less forthcoming than 
expected by Warsaw. In essence, the Three Plus 
One (3+1) format—in contrast to bilateral 
initiatives—has hardly led to any substantive 
outcomes. Therefore, looking at the recent 
record, many observers of Baltic-Polish 
cooperation point out that despite the 
examples of increased cooperation cited above, 
on the whole there has been “more talk than 
walk”. The reasons behind the difficulties 
encountered will be further explored in the 
next section. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8    “Poland offers tank company to join Canadian forces in Latvia”, 
Latvian Public Broadcasting, October 6, 2016.  
   
Mid-sized Poland has been “too big to be small,” and 
has therefore aspired to stand on a more equal footing 
with Germany, France and the UK; it is, at the same 
time, somewhat “too small to be big” in order to serve 
as a central hub and driving force of regional defence 
cooperation 
Even as Baltic-Polish cooperation has fulfilled an 
important political function, in reality this 
format has not been the primary instrument of 
achieving strategic goals—such as becoming an 
integrated part of the Western security 
community—for any of the states involved. In 
pursuit of their integration aspirations, all four 
countries looked to their biggest Western 
allies—most of all the US—to enhance political 
and military ties. Poland, for its part, 
simultaneously sought both greater politico-
military cooperation within the Weimar 
Triangle with the biggest 
European powers, France 
and Germany, as an 
aspiring CEE regional 
power—while also working  
within the Visegrád Group 
as a way of strengthening 
the standing of the region 
as a whole. These efforts 
resulted, for instance, in the 
formation of the Weimar 
(2013) and Visegrád (2016) EU Battlegroups. In 
Warsaw, military cooperation with the Baltic 
states has thus been considered “nice to have” 
but not a real strategic imperative. In the 
relatively benign pre-2014 security 
environment, the same sense could be felt in 
the Baltic capitals: Poland was important, but 
not so essential that developing new initiatives 
to engage Warsaw as a first-choice partner was 
a top priority.  
Additionally, the significant difference in 
political, economic and military potential 
between Poland and the Baltic states presents 
an ongoing challenge for Baltic-Polish 
cooperation. Poland’s population is more than 
seven times larger (and its GDP five times 
larger) than those of the Baltic states combined. 
These figures are reflected in the gap in military 
expenditures: Poland’s defence budget is more 
than five times those of the Baltic states 
combined.9 Finally, its armed forces—measured 
                                                          
9 Defence expenditures in 2017: Poland—$9.935 billion; the Baltic 
states combined—$1.868 billion (Estonia—$0.54 billion; Latvia—
$0.512 billion; Lithuania—$0.816 billion. See North Atlantic Treaty 
in terms of the number of active duty military 
personnel— are four times larger than those of 
the three Baltic countries taken together.10 
While it is clear that mid-sized Poland has been 
“too big to be small,” and has therefore aspired 
to stand on a more equal footing with 
Germany, France and the UK; it is, at the same 
time, somewhat “too small to be big”, from the 
Baltic state’s perspective, in order to serve as a 
central hub and driving force of regional 
defence cooperation. 
However, since 2014 Poland has been emerging 
as a geo-strategically pivotal player in the 
region and a hub of NATO efforts (spearheaded 
by the United States) to bolster deterrence and 
defence on the Alliance’s eastern flank. Its 
efforts to modernise and enhance its own 
national defence capabilities as a bulwark 
against a resurgent Russia have impressed 
many observers.11 It is a host nation to the 
Multinational Corps North East (MNC NE) 
headquarters (HQ) as well as to a US-led NATO 
eFP battlegroup and to the recently deployed 
4,000 troops of the US Army Armoured Brigade 
Combat Team (not to mention the ground-
based SM-3 interceptors’ site that will be part 
of the US global missile defence system as well 
as part of the US contribution to NATO’s 
Ballistic Missile Defence system in Europe).12  
                                                                                       
Organisation, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-
2018)”, Communique PR/CP(2018)091, July 10, 2018.  
10 Active duty military personnel (2017): Poland—105,000; the 
Baltic states combined—24,600 (Estonia—6,100; Latvia—5,500; 
Lithuania—13,000). See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
“Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018)”. 
11 See John R. Schindler, “Poland Stands Up For the West Against 
Russia – Again”, Observer, September 10, 2018.  
12 See US Department of State, “U.S. Relations With Poland”, Fact 
Sheet, April 25, 2018.  
   
There is some degree of “win-lose” thinking in the 
region, whereby the gains of one party—in terms of 
securing a more substantive and visible Allied 
presence—are perceived as potentially diminishing 
the likelihood of gains of others 
The Baltic states became very focused on 
cultivating, on a bilateral basis, relations with 
the lead nations and key partners of the eFP 
battlegroups deployed on their soil 
The hard fact is that reinforcement of the Baltic 
countries via the land domain would be 
impossible without the Alliance’s use of Poland 
as a staging ground and Poland’s own work to 
enable and support reinforcement flows. 
Warsaw has launched a rigorous effort to 
establish a more coherent command and 
control structure based in the country as part of 
the overall NCS review, which includes a new 
Multinational Division North-East (MND NE) HQ 
in Elbląg (located in north-eastern Poland) and, 
perhaps, an army-level HQ in the future as well. 
All this is clearly of benefit and interest to the 
Baltic states, as it increases collective defence 
and deterrence potential in the region.13 
One the other hand, this has also become a 
source of some friction. There is some degree 
of “win-lose” thinking in the region, whereby 
the gains of one party—in terms of securing a 
more substantive and visible Allied 
presence—are perceived as 
potentially diminishing the likelihood 
of gains of others. NATO’s own 
incoherence, piecemeal approach 
and lack of long-term vision in 
enhancing and streamlining 
command and control as well as 
force structures in the region only 
aggravate the problem. 
With the deployment of NATO eFP battlegroups 
in the Baltics, the United States withdrew the 
infantry companies it had deployed, on a 
rotational basis as part of Operation Atlantic 
Resolve, in the three nations since 2014, while 
at the same time bolstering its presence in 
Poland.14 The US presence to the north of the 
                                                          
13 See Kalev Stoicescu and Henrik Praks, Strengthening the 
Strategic Balance in the Baltic Sea Area (Tallinn: International 
Centre for Defence and Security, March 2016).  
14 For more on the measures undertaken by the US and other 
allies and partners in the Baltic states in 2014-2015, see Justyna 
Gotkowska, “NATO’s presence in the Baltic states – reassurance 
Suwałki Gap thus remains small and transient; 
this has become a frequent cause for 
complaints voiced by Baltic officials in different 
fora.15 Ostensibly, the Baltic states support 
Warsaw’s efforts to secure a permanent US 
military presence in Poland, as most recently 
stated by the Baltic prime ministers during their 
meeting with their Polish counterpart.16 
However, there remains a lingering 
cautiousness in the Baltic capitals that such 
efforts by Warsaw (which seem to echo and 
work in synch with the US military thinking and 
emerging posture to 
concentrate more capabilities 
to the south rather than to 
the north of the Suwałki Gap) 
will leave the Baltic states 
with too light a military 
footprint of such a crucial 
NATO Ally, the US.  
This reminds the Baltics of the 
situation in the aftermath of 
the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, when the 
three states pressed the Alliance for a 
contingency plan. Out of fear of diluting NATO’s 
commitments, Poland was then cautious about 
extending NATO’s “Eagle Guardian” plan (that 
focused on the defence of its territory) to cover 
the Baltic states as well. It argued in favour of a 
separate contingency plan for the Baltic states 
instead—a proposal that was opposed by 
Germany. However, Poland’s position was 
interpreted as unhelpful by the Baltic states.17 
 
                                                                                       
of allies or deterrence for Russia?”, OSW Commentary, April 29, 
2015. 
15 One of the most recent examples was at the Annual Baltic 
Conference on Defence (ABCD), organised in Tallinn on 26 
September 2018 by the International Centre for Defence and 
Security and the Estonian Ministry of Defence. 
16 “Baltic states in favour of permanent US military base in Poland: 
report”, Radio Poland, June 5, 2018. 
17 See “Eagle Guardian”, GlobalSecurity.org.  
   
Given the degree of competition between Tallinn, 
Riga and Vilnius for American  attention, having to 
contend with being in Warsaw’s shadow would be a 
little too much to stomach 
At the same time, it is notable that the Baltic 
states became very focused on cultivating, on a 
bilateral basis, relations with the lead nations 
and key partners of the eFP battlegroups 
deployed on their soil. This was first rooted in a 
practical rationale: deployment of the 
battlegroups was a huge challenge to the small 
host nations that absorbed much of their 
attention, energy and time. Insofar as eFP 
deployments indeed act as an important factor 
in shaping bilateral and multilateral defence 
cooperation agendas and priorities, then Riga is 
best positioned to advance defence relations 
with Poland— a significant contributor to the 
eFP battlegroup in Latvia. For Vilnius and 
Tallinn, however, this connects with their 
longer-term policy to develop special defence 
relationships with the lead (“framework”) 
nations as well as other key 
participating countries of the 
battlegroups they host, which 
may divert their attention 
from deepening cooperation 
with Poland.  
Estonian troops, for instance, 
have been involved in 
Afghanistan as part of the British contingent, 
forging a strong connection between the two 
defence establishments.18 Similarly, the 
Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) participated in 
the operations led by another major 
contributor to the Estonia-based eFP 
battlegroup—France—in the Central African 
Republic and, lately, in Mali.19 It should be 
noted that Estonia is the only Baltic nation that 
joined the European Intervention Initiative (EII) 
recently launched by Paris.20 Some of the 
largest Lithuanian “big ticket” defence 
procurement contracts—infantry fighting 
vehicles (IFVs), self-propelled artillery 
howitzers, infantry rifles, ship cannons—have 
been awarded to German suppliers.21 More 
                                                          
18 Chris Holtby, “UK-Estonian defence cooperation in NATO”, 
Estonian World, April 1, 2014.  
19 See “Estonian government approves sending 50 troops to 
French-led Mali mission”, ERR News, March 22, 2018. 
20 “Estonia joins eight EU members in building joint military 
intervention force”, Baltic News Network, June 26, 2018.  
21 This includes the largest ever defence procurement contract 
since the restoration of Lithuania’s independence - approximately 
$440 million for the purchase of 88 “Boxer” IFVs (renamed “Wolf” 
recently, the Iron Wolf mechanised infantry 
brigade of the Lithuanian Armed Forces (LAF) 
became affiliated with a German division HQ 
and not with the MND NE HQ in Poland, as 
envisaged earlier.22 Lithuanian troops 
participating in the UN mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA) serve within a German contingent, 
while Lithuania’s Vessel Boarding Team (VBT) 
was deployed to EUNAVFOR MED Operation 
SOPHIA in the Mediterranean on a German 
Navy ship.23  
Very similar dynamics define the way that the 
Baltic states and Poland approach relations with 
the United States, arguably their key strategic 
partner. All are eager to cultivate bilateral 
political ties with Washington, while the Baltic 
states utilise the so-called 3+1 format as well. 
Poland justifiably sees itself as too big and too 
important to be lumped together with the small 
Baltic countries in conducting defence relations 
with the United States, while for their part the 
Baltic states would inevitably feel marginalised 
and turned into insignificant adjuncts during 
any arrangements made between Warsaw and 
Washington. Given the degree of competition 
between Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius for American  
attention, having to contend with being in 
Warsaw’s shadow would be a little too much to 
stomach, especially while watching Poland 
accrue more and more benefits from the US 
                                                                                       
in the variant delivered to Lithuania). See Ministry of National 
Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, “Minister J. Olekas: ‘The 
Contract of 88 IFV is the signal that Lithuania takes care of its 
security and investments into it seriously’”, News Release, August 
22, 2016.   
22 “On 21 Sep [September] Agreement of Affiliation of Iron Wolf 
Brigade of Lithuanian Armed Forces to a German Army division 
was signed in Vilnius to ensure better interoperability with 
German-led NATO enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group eFP 
in Lithuania among other goals”. Lithuanian MoND, Twitter Post, 
October 21, 2018, 9:10AM.    
23 See Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, 
“Lithuanian unit began service in the UN mission in Mali”, News 
Release, October 19, 2017, and “First Lithuanian Vessel Boarding 
Team deployed to EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA in the 
Mediterranean”, News Release, March 6, 2017.  
   
Intensified Baltic-Polish cooperation would compete 
with the host of other cooperative frameworks, 
measures and commitments within NATO, EU and 
multilateral formats that already significantly stretch 
the small Baltic defence organisations 
military presence in the country. Poland’s 
recent bid to secure permanent stationing of US 
forces by offering $2 billion in spending24—as 
beneficial to regional security as it might be if 
successful—overshadows anything the Baltics 
could ever promise to entice an increasingly 
transactional Trump administration into 
establishing an American military presence to 
the north of the Suwałki Gap. More vocal Baltic 
support for Poland in its efforts to secure a US 
presence would show to Western European 
allies the importance of strengthening US 
involvement in the region. However, it is clear 
that more dialogue and mutual understanding 
among the governments of Poland and the 
Baltic states are necessary on this issue.  
The Baltic states have also been moving in fits 
and starts when it comes to their own trilateral 
defence relations; periods when fierce disputes 
threatened to derail even the most established 
cooperation projects have been followed by 
periods in which the three countries eagerly 
generated new ideas while seeking new forms 
or areas of collaboration. However, it could be 
plausibly argued that ever since the “golden 
four” projects—BALTBAT, BALTNET, BALTRON 
and BALTDEFCOL—were established, there has 
been little in the way of expanding the scope 
and depth of trilateral cooperation with 
projects or initiatives of the same impact on 
national defence capabilities and organisations. 
Indeed, one of those four, BALTBAT, has since 
withered away, while BALTRON has shrunk to 
two participating nations after Estonia’s 
withdrawal in 2015.25  
                                                          
24 Edyta Żemła and Kamil Turecki, “Poland offers US up to $2B for 
permanent military base”, Politico, May 27, 2018. 
25 For a recent update on the state of play of Baltic defence 
cooperation, see Nora Vanaga, “Baltic Military Cooperation: 
Despite lots of talk about joint procurement, 
there have been only some modest projects 
such as purchase of anti-tank munitions 
through the European Defence Agency—and 
even those did not fully yield the expected 
results. (For example, officials in Latvia pointed 
out that the cost of collectively-purchased 
munitions ended up being higher compared to 
what each country would have paid as a result 
of individual tenders). Moreover, after failing to 
agree on operational requirements and 
technical specifications while also proving 
unable to synchronise their 
planning cycles, all three 
nations opted for separate 
national solutions in 
purchasing IFVs, self-
propelled artillery, medium-
range air surveillance radars 
and in other larger and 
smaller procurements. As a 
result, the three missed out 
on an opportunity both to achieve further 
synergies in, for instance, training, maintenance 
and sustainment as well as to enhance 
interoperability. 
While regular trilateral political, political-
military and military formats (Baltic Ministerial 
Committee, Baltic Military Committee, etc.) 
continue as usual and occasionally generate 
useful ad hoc initiatives, there have been no 
recent increases in the actual substance of 
trilateral defence cooperation to allow one  to 
declare that it has reached some completely 
new qualitative and quantitative level. Despite 
pronouncements to the contrary, there is a 
distinct impression that none of the three Baltic 
states regard trilateral military cooperation as 
an absolute priority, and that they only invoke 
its ideals as a matter of political ritual. In some 
areas, there are more bilateral (e.g. between 
Latvia-Lithuania in the areas such as special 
operations forces, maritime surveillance, and 
air defence development) than trilateral 
cooperation projects and programmes going 
ahead. 
Last, but not least, there are also practical 
challenges related to the cooperation capacity 
of the small defence establishments of the 
                                                                                       
Seeking a Common Response”, Centre for Security and Strategic 
Research, Strategic Review, No 11, April 2016.  
   
The current political trends are favourable for 
enhanced security and defence cooperation. 
Moreover, the financial context is also positive, as all 
four countries have been steadily increasing their 
defence spending over the last few years 
Baltic states. Expanding the scope and intensity 
of multilateral cooperation programmes 
requires additional administrative and financial 
resources. Intensified Baltic-Polish cooperation 
would compete with the host of other 
cooperative frameworks, measures and 
commitments within NATO, EU and multilateral 
formats that already significantly stretch the 
small Baltic defence organisations.  
Furthermore, the three Baltic countries 
regularly host (and participate outside their 
territories in) a highly intensive and demanding 
programme of military exercises that absorbs a 
significant amount of their energies and 
attention.26 Due to the high tempo of the 
exercises, continuous involvement in 
international military operations and increasing 
cooperation efforts in multiple directions, there 
are signs both of fatigue and of a reluctance to 
generate further ideas for future cooperation—
as this usually spells more work and more strain 
for the same already overloaded and over-
committed people. On top of that, from a Baltic 
perspective, the frequent and sudden changes 
of key military personnel in Poland inhibit the 
building of mutual trust 
and close working 
relations, thereby adding a 
degree of disruption and 
discontinuity to practical 
cooperation efforts. 
This does not imply that 
there is no space for 
enhancing Polish-Baltic 
military cooperation, as it is a question of 
managing priorities, ambitions, resources and 
programmes in ways that best align with the 
strategic imperatives and political will. 
However, the four countries need to be careful 
and smart in identifying and selecting 
opportunities that add real value, make great 
political and military sense, and do not fizzle 
out due to a lack of follow-through. In the next 
section, we will consider what such 
opportunities could look like. 
 
                                                          
26 As an example, see the list of major military exercises 
conducted by the Lithuanian Armed Forces just in 2017: 
Lithuanian Armed Forces, “Military Exercises 2017”, last updated 
May 5, 2017.  
Various developments across the Alliance and 
within the region offer multiple opportunities 
for the Baltic states to enhance their defence 
cooperation with Poland. Some of these 
opportunities are related to already ongoing 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation efforts in 
the region that need only to be expanded and 
scaled up. Some arise from within each 
country’s defence development needs, plans 
and priorities. Others are driven by impetus key 
external strategic partners as well as from new 
initiatives within the frameworks both of NATO 
and the EU. Exploiting these opportunities, 
however, will require increasingly intensive and 
continuous political and military work from all 
four countries. The current political trends are 
favourable for such enhanced security and 
defence cooperation.  
Moreover, the financial context is also positive, 
as all four countries have been steadily 
increasing their defence spending over the last 
few years and maintain—or are about to 
reach—the benchmark of 2% of GDP for 
defence.27 On the one hand, it is financial 
austerity rather than budget growth that often 
serves as a strong motivating factor for closer 
defence cooperation; on the other hand, 
availability of sufficient funding for cooperative 
initiatives, projects and activities is a necessary 
condition for expanding the scope and intensity 
of such cooperation.  
One important opportunity comes from the 
growing US military re-engagement in Europe 
and in the Baltic Sea region. Various measures 
undertaken by Washington through the 
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)—
particularly those fortifying defence and 
                                                          
27 In 2018, defence spending as a percentage of GDP is expected 
to be 1.98 in Poland, 2.14% in Estonia, 2.00% in Latvia, and 1.96% 
in Lithuania. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Defence 
Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018)”. 
   
Common or better coordinated solutions are the best 
way to increase interoperability of military forces, 
enhance national resilience, strengthen the effect of 
collective deterrence or enable and facilitate successful 
reinforcement by NATO forces in crisis or war 
deterrence in the north-east of the Alliance—
should present possibilities for the Baltic states 
and Poland to work together more closely. The 
US National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA), 
which provides funding for the EDI, encourages 
the Baltic states to spend jointly more of their 
US financial assistance.28 There certainly are 
areas of defence investments where the 
possibility of including Poland in such joined-up 
approaches could make sense, particularly 
when they enable and facilitate the continued 
American military presence in the region.29 (On 
the other hand, the fact that the Baltic states 
themselves could only agree on procurement of 
anti-tank munitions in order jointly to use the 
US assistance is indicative of the difficulties in 
finding areas for common investments or, 
indeed, in expanding the number of 
cooperation partners). 
In some cases, common or better coordinated 
solutions are the best way to increase 
interoperability of military forces, enhance 
national resilience, strengthen the effect of 
collective deterrence or enable and facilitate 
successful reinforcement by NATO forces in 
crisis or war. Eliminating capability gaps that 
may hamper the reinforcement and defence of 
the north-eastern frontier of NATO—in air 
defence, maritime domain (including coastal 
defence), electronic warfare, logistics & Host 
Nation Support (HNS) and other areas—would 
benefit if the four countries allocate the human 
and financial resources necessary to developing 
joined-up approaches and synergies. Air 
defence is a particularly acute capability 
                                                          
28 See Eerik Marmei and Gabriel White, “European Deterrence 
Initiative: Bolstering the Defence of the Baltic States”, 
International Centre for Defence and Security, Policy Paper, 
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29 See Lisa Sawyer Samp, Jeffrey Rathke and Anthony Bell, 
Perspectives on Security and Strategic Stability. A Track 2 Dialogue 
with the Baltic States and Poland (Laham, Boulder, New York, 
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shortfall in the region and must be built up on a 
basis of a coherent regional architecture.30 
Since the Baltic states’ armed forces 
modernisation process is already underway and 
is conducted mainly in co-operation with major 
Western Allies, there will be little room for 
manoeuvre for armament co-operation with 
Poland in the next few years. The same applies 
to the Polish complex procurement 
programmes that are already, and that 
preferably will continue to be conducted with 
major US or European partners. However, since 
the Baltic states often (but not always) prefer 
buying cheaper second-hand military 
equipment, it opens a 
window of opportunity 
for future Baltic military 
tenders. Instrumental in 
this context could be 
financial support from 
the Regional Security 
Assistance Programme 
2022 (ReSAP) that Poland 
started in 2015.31 
At the same time, the joined-up approach could 
be pursued in capability areas where fast 
technological change is driving major changes in 
warfare. From cyberwarfare to unmanned 
autonomous weapon systems, such areas 
require the constant assessment of various 
implications to national defence as well as 
development and testing of new concepts in 
order to stay abreast of overall trends. Concept 
Development and Experimentation (CD&E) is a 
relatively underdeveloped field in the Baltic 
states and Poland, and could become one of 
the ways that the four states come together in 
order to study and introduce new capabilities in 
the region‘s defence. At least in some capability 
areas, NATO Centres of Excellence (COEs) 
hosted by each of the four nations are suitable 
platforms for more extensive CD&E 
collaboration, but new additional mechanisms 
also have to be created.32 At the same time, to 
advance common interests and needs requiring 
                                                          
30 See Christopher Harper, Tony Lawrence and Sven Sakkov, Air 
Defence of the Baltic States (Tallinn: International Centre for 
Defence and Security, April 2016).  
31 See Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Poland Launches Effort To Help Arm 
E. European Allies”, Defense News, October 4, 2015. 
32 Cooperative Cyber Defence COE in Estonia; Strategic 
Communications COE in Latvia; Energy Security COE in Lithuania 
and Counter-Intelligence COE in Poland. 
   
There are significant opportunities for cooperation 
among the four countries in order to advance 
ongoing NATO adaptation aimed at improving the 
Alliance’s ability to respond to various 
contingencies on its eastern flank 
extensive, risky and costly R&T/R&D 
investments as well as industrial development, 
new EU defence cooperation frameworks—
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 
the European Defence Fund—offer 
considerable opportunities to be exploited 
through joint Baltic-Polish initiatives. 
This is not to say that old, time-tested concepts 
and capabilities—and their adaptation to 
contemporary strategic and operational 
realities—do not merit attention or common 
approaches. For instance, in the face of the 
Russian military threat, Poland is establishing 
Territorial Defence Forces as the fifth branch of 
its military—something in which the Baltic 
states have retained considerable experience. 
This could be an opportunity for cooperative 
endeavours and exchanges of knowledge 
concerning legal, doctrinal, organisational and 
other aspects of building, sustaining and 
employing territorial defence forces in times of 
crisis and war. Poland has 
already embraced this idea and 
established a European 
Territorial Defence Regional Co-
operation Initiative (with the 
first conference taking place in 
October 2018 in Warsaw), 
including representatives of the 
Baltic states among other 
countries.33 The initiative will 
facilitate the sharing of experiences and the 
development of closer international co-
operation among territorial defence forces from 
the region and beyond. Enhancing and 
maintaining the special operations forces (SOF) 
capabilities already achieved in the four 
countries, as well as widening the scope of their 
cooperation, is another area where a 
quadrilateral approach could be beneficial—
especially in light of how critical such 
capabilities are in countering various forms of 
potential Russian aggression. 
Although resilience is officially a national 
responsibility in both NATO and EU contexts, 
various aspects of this multi-dimensional and 
highly relevant (especially in the context of 
hybrid threats) concept call for region-wide 
solutions and coordinated plans. In the event of 
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a crisis, the Baltic states are of course likely to 
turn for assistance first to Poland and the 
Nordic countries for reasons of geographical, 
economic and political proximity. Areas such as 
ensuring security of supply of essential goods 
and materials, protecting critical infrastructure 
or countering disinformation would benefit 
from regional cooperation. The resilience of 
societies and governments in crises that fall 
short of NATO’s Article 5 scenarios (but could 
fall under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on 
European Union, for instance) require solidarity 
and mutual assistance—something that must 
be planned and prepared for well in advance. 
Herein lies an opportunity to bring together not 
only the defence establishments but also 
civilian security organisations such as police, 
border guards, customs, internal security and 
intelligence services, rescue agencies and civil 
protection authorities of the Baltic states and 
Poland. 
Military capabilities, however, remain the 
bedrock of strengthening collective defence 
and deterrence in the region. The speed of their 
deployment to the region by NATO as well as 
the ability of the Baltic states and Poland to 
provide for their initial self-defence—in a 
coordinated and synchronised manner—are of 
critical importance. In this context, there are 
significant opportunities for cooperation among 
the four countries in order to advance ongoing 
NATO adaptation aimed at improving the 
Alliance’s ability to respond to various 
contingencies on its eastern flank. Poland’s 
efforts to develop MND NE HQ in Elbląg and the 
recently-launched Danish-led initiative to create 
similar headquarters in Ādaži (Latvia) and in 
Denmark, are important stepping stones in this 
direction; together, they open up new 
opportunities for regional defence cooperation, 
mutual support as well as for common planning 
   
There is still room for better political cooperation and 
coordination. This entails a more proactive stance, 
vocal mutual support and common positions on issues 
affecting the eastern flank in internal NATO debates 
of initial military responses to military 
aggression.34   
The intensive programme of military exercises 
in the region continues to be one of the best 
opportunities to draw the defence 
organisations of the Baltic states and Poland 
more closely together while involving the US, 
Nordic countries, and NATO Allies that 
contribute to the eFP units in the region. In 
November 2018, Polish national exercise 
Anakonda is held, for the first time, in the three 
Baltic states, involving units and personnel not 
only from Poland, but also from a number of 
other NATO Allies (see Annex A). This is a good 
example of what starts as a national initiative is 
scaled up and turned into a region-wide 
cooperation opportunity. However, it is 
necessary to coordinate the national exercise 
cycles better as to avoid overload and also 
better to share training facilities and 
infrastructure, much of which is being 
developed with the assistance of the EDI as well 
as NATO Security Investment Programme 
funding. Individual training of various military 
specialists is another very important direction 
of Baltic-Polish defence cooperation that could 
be intensified, drawing upon the strengths of 
each nation in specific fields as well as on 
existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
programmes. The quantitative and qualitative 
growth of the armed forces of all four countries 
means ever-increasing demand for such 
specialists that can be addressed through 
collaborative efforts. 
While the above discussion focuses primarily on 
the region’s own demand for enhanced 
security, the four countries also often 
undertake efforts—both individually and in 
concert with other partners—to project security 
and stability outside the EU and NATO. 
                                                          
34 See Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia, 
“Multinational Division Headquarters North to be established in 
Latvia and Denmark in 2019”, July 12, 2018. 
International military operations and security 
assistance programmes led by these 
organisations could be one of the opportunities 
for the four countries to make common 
contributions and, figuratively speaking, fly the 
region’s flags in such enterprises— thereby 
increasing visibility as well as impact. One 
particular direction stands out: all four 
countries are ardent supporters of Ukraine and 
provide assistance to its armed forces. The 
existing platform, LITPOLUKRBRIG, could 
become a vehicle of cooperation for all three 
Baltic states and Poland in supporting Ukraine‘s 
defence development and trans-Atlantic 
integration aspirations. 
Poland and the Baltic states share a common 
threat perception as well as an understanding 
of what has to be done, in terms of credible 
deterrence and defence, to deal with the 
military threats in the region. Their strategic 
interests are closely aligned, especially 
regarding creation and maintenance of the 
necessary conditions for enhancing the 
availability and presence of 
US and other NATO forces in 
the north-east of the Alliance. 
Close alignment of the four 
countries will be even more 
important in the future, as 
other allies may become less 
willing to further strengthen 
the NATO military posture in 
the region. Consequently, the web of security 
structures and relationships among the four 
states should not be hard to build and maintain. 
Thus far, the Baltic states and Poland have 
focused primarily on developing bilateral 
relationships (e.g. Poland-Lithuania, Poland-
Latvia, Poland-Estonia). Nevertheless, as 
outlined above, areas of quadrilateral 
cooperation are far from being exhausted, and 
even bilateral relations could be further 
enhanced.  
First and foremost, there is still room for better 
political cooperation and coordination. This 
entails a more proactive stance, vocal mutual 
support and common positions on issues 
affecting the eastern flank in internal NATO 
   
There is also a need to work in close 
coordination on pursuing further enhancement 
of the air and maritime components of NATO’s 
presence in the region 
A robust political commitment to regional structures 
(at army, corps and divisional levels) would be a sign 
of regional cohesion that ideally would encourage 
other allies to join these structures 
debates (e.g. NSC and NFS reform, availability 
of follow-on forces, NATO exercises in the 
region, nuclear policy, and countering Russia’s 
anti-access/area denial, or A2/AD, capabilities). 
The four countries should better coordinate 
their cooperation with the United States—
especially while aligning US military 
engagement in the region with NATO’s eFP. 
They should also consider establishing a 
quadrilateral forum of expert discussions on 
nuclear deterrence issues, in 
order to facilitate common 
positions on the Alliance’s 
nuclear policy. Similarly, 
concerted political effort is 
required to ensure that the EU 
CSDP and the overall direction 
of various EU initiatives in 
security and defence (PESCO, 
European Defence Fund, Capability 
Development Plan) also reflect the countries’ 
shared imperatives of building stronger military 
deterrence and defence in the Baltic Sea area. 
Finally, a joint Baltic-Polish voice would also be 
better heard also in discussions within the 
OSCE, especially on the issue of conventional 
arms control and in the so-called Structured 
Dialogue.  
In the NATO context, one obvious area of Baltic-
Polish cooperation and coordination is the 
ongoing adaptation of NCS and NFS in the 
region as well as broader adaptation of the 
Alliance’s posture. A robust political 
commitment to regional structures (at army, 
corps and divisional levels) would be a sign of 
regional cohesion that ideally would encourage 
other allies to join these structures. The Baltic 
states should consider contributing more staff 
officers to the Polish-led MND NE HQ in Elbląg 
and support the Polish proposal of establishing 
an army-level HQ in the region; at the same 
time, Poland should consider participation in 
setting up the MND North HQ element in Ādaži. 
Poland’s political support to the Baltic states in 
advocating within NATO for the transformation 
of the BAP operation into an air defence 
mission would also be helpful in achieving this 
goal. 
There is also a need to work in close 
coordination on pursuing further enhancement 
of the air and maritime components of NATO’s 
presence in the region, while a further issue to 
tackle jointly is the harmonisation of training 
and exercises of the four battlegroups as well 
as coordination of eFP, VJTF/NRF and follow-on 
forces. Additionally, it should be discussed how 
the three Baltic states might reinforce the 
Polish-led VJTF in 2020. Poland could consider 
contributing not only to the NATO eFP 
battlegroup in Latvia but also in Estonia, in 
order to increase its military footprint further to 
the north and open new possibilities of bilateral 
defence cooperation with Tallinn. The Baltic 
states should also contribute to the NFIU in 
Poland.   
Poland and the Baltic states should intensify 
their cooperation to remove any bottlenecks 
between and within them for the movement 
of allied forces, as part of the broader 
effort by NATO and the European 
Union known as “Military Schengen” 
(and possibly also with the Nordic 
countries through the “Easy Access” 
initiative within Nordic Defence 
Cooperation, NORDEFCO). There is 
much scope for developing 
arrangements to access each 
participating country’s territory via air, land and 
sea to enable quick and efficient troop 
movements using improved infrastructure. Such 
arrangements would greatly increase the 
quality and effect of air, land and maritime 
operations, lessen bureaucracy and ease border 
crossing procedures. They would also be 
particularly useful in the region when sharing 
national training infrastructure and conducting 
multilateral military exercises. Polish and Baltic 
stakeholders should therefore team up both in 
   
Crisis management table-top exercises involving the 
senior political, military and civil security leadership of 
the four countries would be useful in order to 
highlight regional and broader inter-dependencies 
implementing the European Commission’s 
Action Plan on Military Mobility and in using 
Connecting Europe Facility military mobility 
funding in the next multiannual financial 
framework (2021-2027) to improve transport 
infrastructure in the region. The four countries 
should consider the possibility of setting up a 
regional coordination structure to enhance 
military mobility in the region. 
Furthermore, the civil preparedness of the 
Baltic states and Poland should be 
strengthened through cooperative efforts, 
while requirements for maintaining security of 
supply in the region should be regularly 
reviewed. Such reviews can be undertaken as 
part of comprehensive studies on resilience 
conducted in the framework of the EU and 
NATO and bring together elements such as 
critical infrastructure, cyber security, security of 
energy and other supplies, 
strategic communication, etc. 
The expertise of the NATO 
COEs based in the region and 
Hybrid Threats COE in 
Finland could be harnessed 
to inform and advice such 
work. The national focus on 
resilience should be 
supported by a set of coordinated measures 
that would allow each country both to draw 
upon as well as provide immediate assistance 
to their partners while facilitating management 
of various potential crisis scenarios within the 
region. Crisis management table-top exercises 
involving the senior political, military and civil 
security leadership of the four countries would 
be useful in order to highlight regional and 
broader inter-dependencies in maintaining 
national resilience as well as to appreciate the 
various assumptions, constraints and principles 
that each nation’s leaders apply to their crisis 
decision-making.  
As voluntary territorial defence organisations 
are a significant element of deterrence and 
defence in the Baltic states and increasingly in 
Poland, their cooperation could be an 
important part of the quadrilateral defence 
cooperation agenda. The four countries need 
to exchange best practices among their 
territorial defence organisations (Estonia’s 
Kaitseliit, Latvia’s Zemessardze, Lithuania’s 
National Defence Volunteer Forces and the 
Riflemen’s Union, Poland’s Territorial Defence 
Force), coordinate the activities of their 
territorial defence units in border areas 
(especially between Poland and Lithuania in the 
Suwałki Gap) and make better use of each 
other’s training infrastructure.  
Overall, as the programme of national and 
international military exercises in the Baltic 
states is already quite demanding, intensifying 
it would only further overstretch the armed 
forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It is 
necessary, however, to coordinate and 
synchronise national schedules better, provide 
more opportunities for units from all four 
countries to participate in each other’s 
national exercises and jointly advocate for a 
larger number (and size) of NATO exercises in 
the region. Joint Baltic-Polish participation in 
exercises conducted by Nordic partners (e.g. 
Sweden’s Aurora or Finland’s national 
exercises) would also be beneficial in order to 
develop interoperability with these NATO 
partners. Equally important is for Baltic and 
Polish military staffs to draw common lessons 
learned from various exercises that involve all 
four countries, as this can create the basis for 
common initiatives to develop military 
capabilities. Such initiatives could lead to closer 
cooperation—perhaps even building common 
capabilities—in CD&E, especially in land 
operations. 
The Baltic states and Poland should create 
more possibilities for common individual 
training and education of staff officers, NCOs 
and various military specialists as well as for 
developing regional competence and 
knowledge networks in various fields. Lithuania 
and Estonia could join Latvia in its cooperation 
with Poland at the JTAC School in Dęblin. Polish-
Latvian cooperation could include training of 
Latvian self-propelled howitzer operators in 
Poland. Polish-Estonian cooperation could 
include training of Estonian pilots at the Polish 
Air Force Academy in Dęblin, as well as 
   
The four countries should also coordinate their 
initiatives to develop new capabilities within the 
PESCO framework and act as catalysts of EU 
investment into capabilities most relevant to the 
strategic and operational environment in the region 
maintenance of Skytruck aircraft. The four 
countries should also do more to promote the 
exchange of officers taking part in staff officers 
courses of various levels held both in the Baltic 
states and in Poland. Training and Doctrine 
Commands (or their equivalents) of the four 
nations should coordinate their requirements 
and needs more closely. In addition, Estonia 
and Latvia should consider joining the CI COE in 
Krakow. 
The four countries should also coordinate their 
initiatives to develop new capabilities within 
the PESCO framework and act as catalysts of 
EU investment into capabilities most relevant 
to the strategic and operational environment 
in the region. A special emphasis should be 
placed on capabilities necessary for countering 
A2/AD and for the reinforcement and 
survivability of forces in theatre (e.g. electronic 
warfare and cyberwarfare capabilities, 
unmanned autonomous systems, precision 
long-range stand-off fires, C4ISR systems, etc.). 
Poland, Estonia and Latvia, for instance, could 
join the PESCO project on cyber rapid response 
teams and mutual assistance in cyber security 
that is led by Lithuania. The four countries 
could also work more closely in order to 
identify opportunities for joint participation of 
their enterprises and research establishments 
European Defence Fund’s projects. The Baltic 
states, however, need to start moving towards 
fulfilling a benchmark of spending 2% of 
national defence budgets on defence-related 
R&D/R&T if they are to become credible 
partners for Poland (and others) in building and 
sustaining the technological edge NATO and the 
EU enjoy over their adversaries. 
There are a few specific areas in which the 
Baltic states and Poland should aspire to form a 
more tightly integrated defence area with a 
very high degree of interoperability, common 
planning, C2 arrangements, exercises and 
operational cooperation. These include, but are 
not limited to: 
 Air defence, where the Baltic states have 
to make sure their efforts to develop 
systems enabling medium and long-range 
air defence support by NATO‘s Allies also 
provide for smooth cooperation with 
Poland‘s national air defence capabilities, 
to include Patriot systems; 
 Maritime situational awareness, 
protection of sea lines of communication 
(SLOC) and shoreline defence. The four 
countries should consider setting up a 
regional maritime coordination structure 
focused on these aspects. BALTRON could 
be rejuvenated by reviewing its scope and 
mission in order to bring Estonia back and 
open it to Poland’s participation. Poland 
and Estonia should consider joining the 
real-time maritime surveillance data 
exchange system development project 
conducted by Latvia and Lithuania. 
 Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 
and Target Acquisition (ISTAR), which is a 
critical capability in providing early warning 
as well as countering 
Russian A2/AD. The four 
countries could team up to 
study possibilities for joint 
investment and even in 
some cases, common 
ownership of ISTAR assets 
in order to bolster regional 
security and defence. 
Wherever possible, the four 
countries should jointly push for PESCO 
projects in this capability area; 
 Host Nation Support, which needs to be 
carefully standardised across the four 
countries. The four states could develop a 
service network of private-sector 
contractors across the region capable of 
providing maintenance and repair services 
to Allied land forces moving units and 
assets on exercises or operational 
deployments to and within the region; 
 Special operations forces (SOF), which 
could be brought even closer together by 
establishing a regionally focused combined 
   
The quartet does not have to sing at all times and 
cannot replace the entire choir, but when it performs, 
it must be heard loud and clear 
SOF command element.35 This could also 
be a platform to involve the SOF of the US, 
UK and other key allies involved and 
present in the region with such 
capabilities; 
 Cyberwarfare, which despite being the 
subject of  a multitude of existing 
initiatives, including within the EU defence 
cooperation framework, and a bilateral 
U.S.-Lithuanian proposal for a regional 
cyber security centre, still demands more 
integrated Baltic-Polish strategy and 
capabilities if cyber elements of Russia’s 
A2/AD strategy are to be countered. NATO 
CCDCOE in Tallinn is recognised as an 
important hub for cooperation in the area 
of cyber security, and its expertise should 
be utilised;  
 Strategic communication. To strengthen 
deterrence messaging and counter Russia’s 
efforts to undermine trust and solidarity 
among the Allies, Poland and the Baltic 
states should coordinate their strategic 
communication strategies, plans and 
actions more closely—particularly those 
that require synchronised approaches 
during a regional security crisis. Aligning 
strategic communication may also be 
useful also in order to underline the 
importance of a strong US presence in 
Europe in the face of continuing 
transatlantic tensions. 
The Baltic states and Poland could also become 
closer partners in conducting defence outreach 
and in projecting stability and security outside 
NATO and the EU. One particular functioning 
vehicle for engaging a special partner of NATO, 
Ukraine, is already in place—LITPOLUKRBRIG. It 
could be joined by Estonia and Latvia as well. 
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Once all four are participating nations, they 
could then seek opportunities for joint 
deployments of units or headquarters in 
international operations under NATO, EU or UN 
auspices. The Baltic states and Poland should 
also discuss their common interests in NATO’s 
southern flank, especially the possibilities for 
pooling their contributions to its security. The 
Baltic states could review the possibility of their 
engagement, with some niche capabilities (not 
necessarily in large numbers), in the Polish-led 
V4 EU Battlegroup in the future. 
The above point regarding common interests, 
positions and actions in a southern direction is 
an important consideration, as its 
implementation would help to ensure that ever 
closer Baltic-Polish defence cooperation does 
not lead to fragmentation and regionalisation of 
security in NATO. The principle of indivisibility 
of the security of the Alliance is a very 
important one to uphold, and Poland, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania need to show solidarity 
with the security concerns of their Allies on the 
southern flank.  
At the same time, as highlighted in these 
recommendations, it is very important to 
involve Allies from other geographical regions 
in existing regional cooperation formats in the 
Baltic Sea and Northern Europe. The Northern 
Group is already an increasingly important 
political instrument that simply needs to be 
given more practical substance. NATO’s eFP and 
BAP are proving to be 
valuable tools to facilitate the 
involvement of nations such 
as Spain, Portugal, Italy, 
Slovenia, Albania and Croatia. 
However, Baltic-Polish 
defence cooperation is 
primarily needed to bolster 
security of NATO’s eastern flank—and, by 
extension, the entire Alliance—and to anchor 
the US to Europe’s defence during an era of 
geopolitical turbulence and uncertainty. The 
quartet does not have to sing at all times and 
cannot replace the entire choir, but when it 
performs, it must be heard loud and clear. 
   
Polish-Estonian 
Quadriga talks  
Meetings between MFA and MoD secretaries of state (first held in 2013, with the most 
recent edition taking place in 2016). 
Polish-Baltic Defence 
Ministers meeting 
Planned as an annual event with a rotational host; first in 2013 in Poland, second in 
2014 in Latvia and third in 2015 in Ukraine (th latest one to be held in this format). 
Polish-Baltic Presidents 
meeting 
Irregular; held in 2006, 2011, and 2014 (in 2012, Lithuania’s president cancelled 
participation due to bilateral tensions).  
Polish-Baltic Prime 
Ministers meeting 
Irregular; held in 2010, 2014, 2017 and 2018. 
Nordic-Baltic Eight 
(NB8) plus Visegrád 
Four (V4) Foreign 
Ministers meeting 
Regional consultations on security, economy, energy and EU issues between the V4 
(CZE, HUN, POL, SVK,) and NB8 (DNK, EST, FIN, ISL, LTU, LVA, NOR, SWE) countries; 
held since 2013; the latest meeting held in 2017 in Poland 
Northern Group (NG) 
Consultations on regional security issues between  DEU, GBR, NLD, POL, the Baltic 
(EST, LVA, LTU) and Nordic (DNK, FIN, NOR, SWE ) countries, held on the level of 
defence ministers and security policy directors since 2010; latest meeting took place in 
the Hague in 2018. 
Bucharest Nine 
Consultations before NATO summits on security and defence issues between BGR, 
ROU, the V4 countries and Baltic states; first meeting in 2014 in Poland (presidential 
level); latest meeting held in 2018 (defence minister level)  
Polish-Baltic 
presidential security 
advisers meeting 
Annual consultations with rotational hosts since 2013; format subsequently opened 
for Sweden and Finland; the latest meeting was held in 2017 in Riga. 
Nordic, Baltic and 
Polish defence 
committees’ meeting 
Annual consultations on security and defence issues among DNK, EST, FIN, LTU, LVA, 
NOR, POL, SWE, featuring representatives of parliamentary defence committees; the 
latest meeting was held in 2018 in Poland. 
eFP Latvia defence 
ministers meeting 
Consultations on shaping NATO eFP in Latvia among contributing nations to the 
Canadian-led battlegroup (currently LVA, CAN, ESP, POL, ITA, SVN, ALB), held since 
2016. 
“Quint” defence 
ministers meeting 
 
Consultations among members of the US-led military training mission to Ukraine (USA, 
GBR, CAN, POL, LTU). 
 
   
NATO Assurance 
Measures 
A mechanised company from POL (150 soldiers with 26 vehicles including 15 APCs) 
exercising in the Baltic states in 2016 (one month rotation in each: June in LVA, July in 
EST, August in LTU) 
NATO enhanced 
Forward Presence (eFP) 
An armoured company from POL within the Canadian-led battalion-sized battlegroup 
in Ādaži (170 soldiers with 14 PT-91 Twardy tanks) on six-month rotations since 2017; 
occasionally augmented by other subunits (in 2017, by an artillery subunit with 
Langusta self-propelled multiple rocket launchers)   
Multinational Corps 
Northeast Szczecin 
(MNC NE) 
8 officers from LTU, 4 from EST and 4 from LVA 
Multinational Division 
North-East Elbląg 
(MND NE) 
2 officers from LTU, 1 officer from EST.  
NATO Counter 
Intelligence Centre of 
Excellence (CI COE) in 
Krakow 
LTU is one of the sponsoring nations. 
NATO Strategic 
Communications 
Centre of Excellence 
(STRATCOM COE) in 
Riga 
POL is one of the sponsoring nations of NATO STRATCOM COE in Riga (one person). 
NATO Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre 
of Excellence (CCD COE) 
in Tallinn 
POL is a member of CCD COE in Tallinn (one person). Teams from POL (National 
Cryptology Center) participate in world’s biggest cyber exercise Locked Shields, held 
annually in EST. 
NATO Energy Security 
Centre of Excellence 
(ENSECCOE) in Vilnius 
POL is finalising procedures necessary to join the centre, which is expected to happen 
in the end of 2018 or in early 2019. 
NATO Force 
Integration Units 
(NFIU) 
POL has sent officers to the NFIUs in the Baltic states (2 to LTU, 1 to LVA, 1 to EST).  
Baltic Air Policing 
(BAP) 
POL has participated in BAP regularly since 2006, with an augmented presence after 
2014 (7 times in total, the first time with F-16 jets in in 2017). 
   
Joint Multinational 
Training Group - 
Ukraine 
POL, LTU, LVA and EST send military instructors to UKR to train Ukrainian troops and 
special operations forces together with USA, GBR and CAN at the Yavoriv International 
Peacekeeping and Security Centre. 
EU Battlegroup (EUBG) 
Polish-led EUBG in 2010 included LTU and LVA among others (other contributing 
nations: SVK, DEU). 
EDA Joint Procurement 
Initiatives (JIP) 
In 2013, POL joined the JIP launched by the Baltic states for the procurement of Carl 
Gustav recoilless rifle ammunition. 
PESCO POL, LTU, LVA and EST participate in the Military Mobility project led by NLD and DEU. 
Baltic Defence College 
(BALTDEFCOL) 
POL fills one post in the Directing Staff and sends students to  courses. Letter of Intent 
on Cooperation with the Polish War Studies University signed in 2018. 
Military exercises 
POL minesweepers contribute to removal of WW2-era naval mines  in the waters of 
the Baltic states in Baltic Fortress and Open Spirit exercises.  
POL military exercise Anakonda 2018, held on 7-16 November 2018, is also conducted, 
for the first time, in the three Baltic states. In the Baltic states and the Baltic Sea, it will 
employ about 5,000 troops (17,500 in total). In addition to POL, EST, LTU and LVA, the 
remaining three of V4 (CZE, HUN, SVK) as well as ROU, TUR and USA are also 
participating in the exercise. The exercise aims to integrate military and non-military 
capabilities in order to achieve ability to conduct shaping and decisive operations as a 
coalition/multinational response to hybrid threats and their escalation to potential 
Article 5 violations. 
Regional Security 
Assistance Programme 
2022 (ReSAP) 
ReSAP was established in 2015 and has been coordinated by the MoND since, It is 
directed to a regional group of states: BGR, CZE, EST, HUN, LTU, LVA, ROU, SVK. ReSAP 
is aimed at: strengthening political, military and industrial cooperation among 
participating states; strengthening regional military capabilities through training at 
Polish Armed Forces training centres and acquiring Polish military equipment 
(credited); enhancing interoperability through using the same military equipment and 
repair facilities and through common military training and exercises; donating spare 
military equipment of Polish Armed Forces to participating states. 
Lithuanian-Polish-
Ukrainian Brigade 
(LITPOLUKRBRIG) 
LITPOLUKRBRIG HQ was established in 2009 with a seat in Lublin (Poland); it reached 
full operational readiness in 2017 (around 100 personnel); LTU affiliated one unit – the 
Grand Duchess Birutė Uhlan Battalion. 
   
Military training 
Training of Lithuanian GROM MANPADS operators has been conducted at Koszalin Air 
Force Training Centre.  
Military exercises 
In 2017, POL participated in Iron Wolf (land forces), Flaming Thunder (artillery), 
Flaming Sword (special operations forces) and Tobruq Legacy (air defence) exercises. 
Special Operations 
Forces 
A close cooperation between POL and LTU SOF has developed since 2001. In 2013, it 
was formalised in a separate MoU. Both SOFs participated in the NRF component in 
2015. They cooperated earlier in Afghanistan (2007-2008). 
Land Forces 
In 2017, Polish and Lithuanian Defence Ministers declared intensified cooperation 
between the Iron Wolf Lithuanian Mechanised Infantry Brigade and Polish 15
th
 
Mechanised Brigade from Giżycko.  
Procurement LTU acquired GROM MANPADS for €34mn in 2014 (deliveries 2014-2021). 
Vessel tests 
LTU tested its mine-hunter vessel at the Polish test facility in Gdynia (measurement-
control area). 
Joint Terminal Attack 
Controller (JTAC) 
training 
Cooperation has been based on Memorandum of Agreement signed by Polish and 
Latvian Defence Ministers in 2013. Training has been conducted in Tactical Air Control 
Party Training Centre in Dęblin. LVA fills 2 instructor positions at this centre. 
Military exercises 
Exercises take place on a permanent basis within the eFP  in Latvia. Exercises of Polish 
and Latvian SOF take place as well.  
Vessel tests 
In 2015, on the basis of the Polish-Latvian memorandum LVA tested its mine-hunter 
vessel at the Polish test facility in Gdynia (measurement-control area). The 
memorandum allows LVA to test four more vessels. 
Military exercises 
Poland contributes to the annual Spring Storm exercise (air defence of Ämari airbase, 
close air support, air interdiction). Exercises of Polish and Estonian Special Operations 
Forces take place as well. 
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